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ABSTRACT
This paper focuses on the Northern Territory (NT) as a case study for the
examination of Commonwealth/State financial relations in the area of
Aboriginal affairs. The paper considers in detail the procedures by which
Commonwealth revenue is allocated to the Territory. It describes the role
of the Commonwealth Grants Commission (CGC) in the budget process,
and the impact of fiscal equalisation on the Territory's budgetary
outcome.
The paper pays particular attention to the nature of the 'Aboriginal
components' in this budgetary assessment process, especially the impact
on Commonwealth allocations, of disability factors related to the
Territory's Aboriginal population, and the CGC assessment of the
'Aboriginal Community Services' expenditure function. It is argued that
the health of the NT budget is inextricably bound to the Territory's
Aboriginal population. Recent calls for a more comprehensive accounting
of Territory Government expenditure on services and programs for
Aborigines reflect increasing awareness of the fiscal significance of this
component. Future planning for the design, delivery and funding of
programs and services for Aboriginal people will require a breakdown of
expenditure data at the State and Commonwealth level.
The present paper precedes CAEPR Discussion Paper No. 30 which
examines the same issue of Commonwealth/State financial relations in the
NT from the perspective of actual government expenditure on programs
and services oriented to Aboriginal people. In effect, the present paper
considers the macro-funding environment in which the Territory budget
is determined, and analyses the nature and impact of the 'Aboriginal
components' within that fiscal process; whilst Discussion Paper No. 30
examines the expenditure which the Territory Government allocates to the
delivery of particular programs and services for the Territory's
Aboriginal population.
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Foreword
In 1991, CAEPR published a discussion paper 'Funding allocations to
Aboriginal people: the Western Australia case' by W.S. Arthur. In the
foreword to that paper, I noted that the focus on Western Australia (WA)
was not intended as a one-off exercise; the choice of WA was primarily
linked to Mr Arthur's research experience and interest. In August 1991,
the report of a Commonwealth/State/Territory/Local Government
Working Party, Achieving Greater Co-ordination of Aboriginal and
Torres Strait Islander Programs and Services, was endorsed by the
Australian Aboriginal Affairs Council and became publicly available.
Subsequently, there has been a great deal of debate, especially in the
Northern Territory (NT), about the role of the Commonwealth Grants
Commission (CGC) and the additional resources paid to State/Territory
Governments to offset the recognised socioeconomic disadvantage of their
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander citizens.
This discussion paper is the first of two that focuses on the Northern
Territory as a case study of Federal/State financial relations in Aboriginal
affairs. The paper attempts to gauge the influence that the significant
Aboriginal component of the NT population plays in CGC determination
of the NT Government's relative fiscal need under the broad policy ambit
of fiscal equalisation. This discussion paper and the next ('Estimating
Northern Territory Government expenditure on programs and services to
Aboriginal people: problems and implications') can be conceptualised as
inter-related parts of one research project. The first focuses on broad
financial flows from the Commonwealth to the NT, with a special focus
on disability factors associated with Aboriginality; the second focuses on
identifiable NT Government expenditure on Aboriginal people. CAEPR
Discussion Papers Nos 29 and 30 can stand alone, but they make greater
analytical sense if read consecutively.
The focus on the NT is partly determined by the relative significance of
its Aboriginal population. It is also influenced by the willingness of the
NT Government to have data provided to the AAAC published. As Diane
Smith clearly demonstrates, the issue of Federal/State financial relations
in Aboriginal affairs is extremely complex. The availability of data is
essential to an understanding of an associated range of important
Aboriginal economic policy issues that are raised in both papers. The
assistance of the NT Government and the CGC has been of critical
importance for the successful completion of this complex research task.
Jon Altman
Series Editor
November 1992
In the aftermath of significant events since 1990, including the formation
of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission (ATSIC), the
release of a series of government reports,1 the erratic push for 'new
federalism', and political manoeuvrings at the June 1992 Heads of
Government meeting, the issue of Commonwealth/State2 financial
relations within Aboriginal affairs has come under increasing attention.
The historical legacy of these federal relations has meant that the funding
process in Aboriginal affairs is extremely complicated.
One of the major difficulties facing Aboriginal people and their
organisations is negotiating their funding and servicing requirements
within the entrenched complexities of Commonwealth and State financial
relations. There are considerable repercussions for Aboriginal economic
status and self-determination, not only from the tangible end-products of
government expenditure, but also from the very processes by which State
Governments negotiate, and are apportioned, their budgetary allocations
from the Commonwealth.
This paper focuses on the Northern Territory (NT) as a case study for the
examination of Commonwealth/State financial relations in the area of
Aboriginal affairs. The procedures by which Commonwealth revenue is
allocated to the NT are considered in detail. In particular, the role of the
Commonwealth Grants Commission (CGC) in the budget process is
described, and the impact of the key principle of fiscal equalisation and of
disability factors used by the CGC to determine the NT's budgetary
outcome are assessed. While final decisions about the total revenue
available to the Territory from the Commonwealth lie firmly with the
latter, the size of the NT budget, relative to other States, is intimately
linked to submissions it prepares and recommendations by the CGC.
Particular attention is paid here to the nature of the 'Aboriginal
components' in this budgetary process, especially the impact on
Commonwealth general revenue grants to the NT of disability factors
related to the Territory's Aboriginal population, and the CGC assessment
of the 'Aboriginal Community Services' expenditure function.
A range of financial data are used in the Commonwealth process of
determining the NT budget for the financial year 1990-91. Both the
Commonwealth and the Territory provide annual budget overviews of
Territory funding, and the NT Government provides expenditure and
revenue data to the CGC for its annual update of general revenue grant
relativities. Data for NT expenditure under the Aboriginal Community
Services function has been obtained from the CGC 'Needs Classification
Listing, 1990-91'.
The present paper precedes CAEPR Discussion Paper No. 30 which
examines the issue of Commonwealth/Territory financial relations from
the perspective of the NT Government's actual expenditure on programs
and services oriented to Aboriginal people. In effect, the present paper
considers the macro-funding environment in which the Territory budget
is determined and analyses the nature and impact of the Aboriginal
components within that fiscal process. Discussion Paper No. 30 examines
the internal expenditure environment which the NT Government has
established with respect to the delivery of particular programs and
services to Aboriginal people.
The fiscal role of the Commonwealth Grants Commission
The CGC was established in 1933 (and converted into an independent
statutory body in 1973) to advise the Commonwealth Government on the
need for special block grants to States. Claimant States variously made
submission to the CGC for such grants on the basis of their financial
disadvantage (CGC 1983, 1990a, 199la). In 1976, the CGC's role was
limited to recommending the proportion of the total Commonwealth funds
for local government which should be made available to each State.3
Following the Self Inquiry into Local Government Finance
(Commonwealth of Australia 1985), the Commonwealth phased out the
CGC's percentage share recommendation and replaced it with an
assessment in the form of relative per capita distributions (or relativities,
as they are known) to be phased in by 1989-90.
From 1979, the NT was included in CGC recommendations to the
Commonwealth on the need for special block grants and could submit a
claim for assistance. In 1981 the CGC undertook its first review of grant
relativities for all six States (excluding the NT and the Australian Capital
Territory). The NT has been included in this procedure since 1988-89,
receiving its first financial assistance grants based on CGC relativities in
1989. The principle of annual updates of grant relativities, estimated on
the basis of rolling five-yearly financial data, was adopted in 1988. Over
the last decade the CGC's major task has been to advise the
Commonwealth Government on these relativities for each State and
Territory (CGC 1990b, 199la).
As the CGC notes, its 'concern is with relativities, not absolutes' (CGC
1990a: 2); it has no part in determining the total funds available for the
pool of general revenue grants. Its approach to recommending relativities
for the distribution of Commonwealth general purpose grants is based on
each State and Territory's capacity to raise revenue and provide a range
of standard services, not its performance. For CGC purposes,
'governments are not obliged to spend or tax at standard levels; the system
simply gives them the capacity to do the one, provided they do the other'
(CGC 1990a: 3). What a State Government actually does with general
revenue grants makes no difference to its assessed relativity. Hence, while
a State may have its share of Commonwealth grants increased due to low
revenue-raising capacity or high service provision costs, it is not
obligatory on that State to apply any part of its untied funds towards
addressing or overcoming any identified deficiencies. An exception to
this, and one outside any control by the CGC, is the Commonwealth use of
specific purpose payments (SPP) for both capital and recurrent purposes.
These payments are invariably granted conditional on Commonwealth
policy objectives being pursued in specific expenditure areas.4
While the CGC emphasises its independent, 'policy neutral' role within the
federal system, there is considerable competition between States aimed at
having the CGC accept arguments regarding their respective fiscal needs.
In times of recent Commonwealth fiscal restraint, the CGC review
process has become 'an important part of the political battlefield and
submissions presented to it must be expected to increasingly reflect the
broader political competition from which it previously had been partly
protected' (Walsh 1989: 2). Fletcher (1992) has noted that conflicting
regional politics, asserted by particular States, have historically had an
important impact upon the determinations of the CGC and have been
crucial to the vitality of the federal fiscal process. Attempts to politicise
the CGC's role include the recent vigorous expression of Aboriginal
regional interests, seeking to expand the Commission's brief and
questioning existing Commonwealth/State financial arrangements (see
ATSIC 199la; Central Land Council (CLC) 1991; Crough 1991;
Northern Land Council (NLC) 1991).
The impact of fiscal equalisation and disability factors
At one level, the CGC's role is based on a formula-based approach to
assessing and recommending relativities between States aimed at achieving
fiscal equalisation between them. However, there is also an element of
subjective judgement in the CGC's determinations. Whilst the formulae
upon which fiscal equalisation are based are complex, the objectives of the
equalisation principle are not. The CGC recommendations based on fiscal
equalisation are designed to make it possible for a State to provide the
same level of public services as other States (on average) without
imposing higher taxes and charges, provided it makes the same revenue
effort (CGC 1992a: 75). The process does not ensure that equity between
citizens is actually achieved (Walsh 1989). The mechanism of fiscal
equalisation, in the pursuit of capacity equity between States, has been
progressively refined by the CGC in the course of its own determinations
and review process, and as a result of Commonwealth and State input. The
equalisation principle forms the fiscal 'glue' which holds federalism
together and underpins the CGC's role in achieving the 'equality in
diversity' basic to the Australian federal system (see Fletcher 1992; CGC
1983; Walsh 1989).*
The starting point for CGC assessment of state relativities is a detailed
analysis of some 100 functional areas standardly contained within state
budgets.6 Activities such as education, health, welfare and police are
included, while housing and roads are excluded. The focus is on state
recurrent expenditure activities and costs, so that capital expenditures are
excluded. State expenditures are adjusted to consistent definitions and
from these figures, 'standard1 expenditures (the population-weighted
average of expenditures by the States) are calculated for each category. A
similar process is carried out on the revenue side of state budgets. This
process results in the preparation of a 'standard' budget.
The Commission then carries out separate needs assessments for each area
of standard state expenditure based on the 'factor assessment method'.
Under this approach, the Commission identifies and quantifies specific
factors which differentially affect costs within expenditure areas in each
State. These factors represent any influences beyond a State's control that
require it to spend more, or enables it to spend less than other States to
achieve the same objective (CGC 1992a: 75). Cost differences attributable
to varying state policies and the efficiency with which services are
provided have, by and large, been excluded from CGC assessments. The
result is what the CGC refers to as 'standardised expenditure' (that is, the
'amount a State would need to spend to provide the same level of service
at the same level of efficiency as the other States on average'), and
'standardised revenue' (that is, the 'revenue a State would collect if it
made an average effort to raise revenue', with effort being indicated, for
example, by rates and coverage of taxes) (ibid.: 75).
The CGC's main task in this determination of standardised budgets is to
identify and measure the non-policy differences in revenue-raising
capacity and in costs of providing services, termed 'disabilities'. Hence,
differences in a State's revenue-raising capacity are due to differences in
revenue bases. Differences in the costs of providing services may be due
to a number of factors which the CGC measures, including: having
different proportions of the population in the target group for a service
(such as school-age children); the social composition of the population
(including its Aboriginal composition); the physical and economic
environment; economies or diseconomies of scale; urbanisation; and the
spatial distribution of the population to be served. The CGC then applies
disability weights to these factors which have been derived from the
average, actual expenditure patterns of the States. The CGC is not
concerned with the absolute cost to each State associated with these
disability factors, but with the relative level of costs between States.
Clearly, the degree of equalisation achieved by consideration of such
disabilities will be influenced across States by changes in the range of
disabilities recognised by the CGC and by the complex practical problems
in measuring them. The CGC relies heavily upon data from the Australia
Bureau of Statistics (ABS) and from the States for its assessment of
disabilities, and periodically reviews the accuracy and suitability of its
measurement procedures. At the same time, it acknowledges the existence
in its assessment process, of important subjective judgements to do with
deciding just what influences are beyond the control of the States, and
sometimes in the measurements themselves (CGC 1990a: 4). The
'increasingly slippery category' of disabilities is also influenced by
State/Territory arguments for inclusion of new disability factors and
expenditure areas, and new methods of determining the associated factor
values (Fletcher 1992: 14).
Subtracting a State's total standardised revenue from its total standardised
expenditure and adjusting the result for the standard, or average, budget
result gives a State's total requirement for financial assistance from the
Commonwealth. A State's final global relativity factor is calculated by
converting that financial requirement, after subtracting Commonwealth
specific purpose payments it receives7, to per capita terms and expressing
it as a proportion of the comparable Victorian baseline figure (Victoria's
relativity factor is 1.000) (CGC 1992a: 76). The relativities calculated in
the CGC 1992 Update Review are shown below in Table 1. Basically, the
Table 1. State and Territory per capita relativity factors,
assessed by the Commonwealth Grants Commission, 1991 and
1992 updates.
State/Territory CGC relativity factor
1991 update 1992 update a
New South Wales
Victoria
Queensland
Western Australia
South Australia
Tasmania
Northern Territory
1.015
1.000
1.335
1.408
1.526
1.731
5.673
0.970
1.000
1.317
1.369
1.505
1.713
5.660
a.These relativity factors are derived from the CGCs reference of March 1992, where the
assessments of standardised revenue assume that Victoria had no capacity to raise revenue
from offshore oil and gas in Bass Strait (CGC 1992a: 39).
Source: Commonwealth Grants Commission (1992a: 56).
relativity assessment means that for every dollar per head of population
Victoria received in general revenue grants in 1991-92, the NT received
$5.66.
The general impact of these relativity factors is to initiate a transfer of
revenue raised in New South Wales and Victoria to the other five States.
This redistribution reflects the fact that on average, over the period 1984
to 1991 (CGC 199la: 13-14) only the two largest States had a higher
relative capacity to raise revenue than the others, and a relatively lower
cost of providing services. The relativities also highlight the fact that
Queensland, Western Australia and the NT have higher cost structures
resulting in less developed infrastructure in remote areas, narrower
economic bases and more dispersed, smaller populations. In terms of their
social composition, these States also account for over one-half of the total
Aboriginal population.
The distribution of Commonwealth general purpose grants using the fiscal
equalisation methodology is being increasingly questioned by the two
larger States. Recent pressure has been exerted by Victoria and New
South Wales to have the CGC basis of assessment changed from
equalisation which, they argue, amounts to a 'welfare subsidy to the two
States (Queensland and Western Australia) which are exhibiting economic
growth' (Premier Kirner quoted in I. Davis 'The fight for a slice of the
fiscal cake', The Canberra Times, 17 June 1992). It has been argued that
these two States are now bearing the consequences of their own self-
interest, rather than the disadvantageous impact to them of fiscal
equalisation.8 While all States (with the exception of the ACT) received
higher Commonwealth general revenue grants in 1992-93 than they did in
1991-92, New South Wales and Victoria were the favoured recipients
among the States of higher additional payments. Effectively, at the June
1992 Premiers' Conference in Canberra the precedent was set whereby
the distribution of some additional general-purpose grants from the
Commonwealth (the $166 million discretionary payment) occurred on an
equal per capita basis. Both Victoria and New South Wales chose to
receive their discretionary payments under the equal per capita method,
while all other States remained with the relativities method
(Commonwealth Treasurer 1992). Victoria and New South Wales also
foreshadowed that they would submit reports to the next conference on
the future of equalisation. As seen above, the NT fares exceedingly well
with respect to the magnitude of the relativity factor assessed for it by the
CGC for general revenue grants and is highly dependent upon this global
factor to achieve the capacity to establish and maintain services at the
same level as other larger States.
The Aboriginal component in estimating CGC disabilities
The CGC process of determining final relativities to account for state
expenditure and revenue disabilities includes assessing the social,
demographic, residential and economic characteristics of each State's
Aboriginal population. In particular, disability factors related to the
higher cost of service provision to Aboriginal people are used in a wide
range of functional areas within each State's budget (e.g. health,
education, prisons, police and the administration of justice, child welfare,
national parks and others). Again, the Commission is not concerned with
the absolute levels of costs associated with these disability factors for each
State, but rather with the relative level of costs.
The 'Aboriginal effect1 in disability factors is most often seen within the
social composition factor, but also in dispersion and scale factors
associated with the locational distribution of the Aboriginal population.
The impact of the Aboriginal component in CGC assessments is not
uniformly weighted across expenditure areas. Hence, with respect to
assessing factors relating to Aboriginally in the area of pre-school
education, the CGC determines a unit-of-use factor (u) estimated on the
number of three-year old Aboriginal children residing in non-
metropolitan areas of a State, added to the total four year-old Aboriginal
population and three-year olds from low income families in metropolitan
areas. To this is added a social composition (m) factor where those
Aboriginal children aged three and four residing in non-metropolitan
areas are weighted by 1.7. The comparative factor values assessed by the
CGC for this particular state expenditure area are set out in Table 2.
In this area of assessed need the NT obtains a greater disability factor
value as a result of the demographic profile and residential location of
pre-school Aboriginal children in its population. In the budget area of
primary education (government and non-government) the social
composition disability factor means that Aboriginal children in non-
metropolitan areas of each State are similarly weighted by 1.7, while
secondary and technical education Aboriginal students in non-
metropolitan areas are weighted by 1.15.
In the expenditure area of general medical services, the social composition
factor is assessed on the basis of selected age and sex bands of the
Aboriginal population to which weights are applied to reflect the higher
usage of hospitals by Aborigines. These measures are derived from data
on actual utilisation of respective state hospitals. In the area of public
health the Aboriginal population in each State is uniformly weighted at
2.7. The expenditure category of child welfare is weighted on the basis of
ABS income data. Aboriginal children in low income families are
weighted by 7.0 and those not in low income families are weighted by 4.0.
Table 2. Commonwealth Grants Commission factor values for
pre-school education by State/Territory, 1991.
StateAerritory Factor values
pre-school education
Units of use (u) Social composition (m)
New South Wales
Victoria
Queensland
Western Australia
South Australia
Tasmania
Northern Territory
1.0000
0.9569
1.0324
1.0956
0.9792
1.0928
1.5972
1.0000
0.9841
1.0123
1.0268
1.0052
1.0018
1.2398
Source: CGC(199Ic).
In such assessments it could well be that census shortcomings in estimating
remote area Aboriginal populations (Taylor 1992), related
underestimations of unemployment levels (Smith 1991), and high non-
response rates to income questions, may lead to lower unit measurements
(and hence factor values) by the CGC than might otherwise be the case.
The CGC accepts that it costs all States and Territories more to provide
services to Aboriginal people (CGC 1992b: 8). The social composition
and other disability factors allow for this by giving those States and
Territories with higher numbers of Aboriginal people and 'traditional
Aboriginals (requiring) particular service delivery policies' in their
populations, a greater disability factor value (CGC 1991c). In other
words, certain cost-related characteristics of the Aboriginal population
within each State become assessed components of disability factors and can
have considerable effect on the measurement of factor values for
recurrent, standard state budget expenditure items. This Aboriginal
component to disability factors is spread across a range of expenditure
items, including education, health, welfare and legal services.
A number of Aboriginal organisations and researchers have increasingly
pointed to the lack of accountability in state use of monies obtained as a
result of the Aboriginal component of various disability factors (see CLC
1991; NLC 1991; NT Alice Springs Town Campers Organisation 1991;
Crough 1992). The chairperson of ATSIC has strongly criticised the
'share-without-care' methodology as having technical validity, but being
highly questionable in terms of social justice principles and providing an
incentive to perpetuate disadvantage1 (O'Donoghue 1990: 8). O'Donoghue
argues that an expenditure disability only exists to the extent that it is
recognised by expenditure being allocated to it in accordance with the
means by which the funds were initially obtained. Correspondingly,
indications that an expenditure disability has ceased to exist, or is being
gradually alleviated, should be reflected in decreasing expenditure levels.
The CGC would agree that a disability is only recognised if reflected in
state expenditure. There is no ideal standard against which state
expenditures are assessed. Rather, as noted above, expenditure disabilities
are assessed by the CGC against the average of expenditures by all States.
Effectively, state policy concerning particular functional areas and the
associated allocation of funds within them, are the immediate determinants
of the Australia-wide average. However, the CGC's ability to link actual
state expenditure to specific measured disability values is highly dependent
upon their access to detailed state expenditure accounts and to the
availability of supporting statistical data concerning particular budget
functions. For example, in the area of education and health services,
reasonable data are available to the CGC on Aboriginal access and use. In
many other areas such data are not available, and state accounts provided
to the CGC are invariably not disaggregated according to services and
costs associated with the Aboriginal population. The CGC is not involved
in auditing state expenditure in terms of performance outcome.
Nevertheless, there will be increasing calls from Aboriginal communities
and organisations for state and local government authorities to be more
accountable for the Aboriginal disability monies they receive in their
general revenue grants, and for there to be greater transparency to the
Commonwealth determination and distribution of such monies to the
States.
Disability factors and the Northern Territory budget
The CGC has accepted that the NT has special fiscal needs arising from a
number of characteristics of its economy and population that relate to
costs of services. By virtue of self-government status, the Territory is
seen to have unique 'stage of development1, as well as 'minimum
establishment', expenditure disabilities. These relate to the costs and
disabilities associated with establishing museums and libraries; the need
for updating and establishing new statutes and laws; for administering tax
collection and debt charges; for establishing local government and town
planning; and to the relatively short period of operation of an independent
Territory public service (NT Government 1991a: 90). Further, the NT
has a relatively limited capacity to raise state-like revenues (on account of
its narrow economic base and small population) and a higher per capita
cost of providing services to its population, assessed by the CGC as being
approximately 2.5 times that of other States (CGC 1990a, 1991a).
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The Aboriginal component of these cost disabilities is significant in
determining the NT's final share of Commonwealth revenue grants. In
1991, the NT Aboriginal population represented approximately 22 per
cent of its total population (ABS 1992).9 This fact influences the CGC's
assessments of the Territory's need for general revenue assistance in a
number of ways. The economic circumstances of the Aboriginal
population indirectly influence measures of household income and the
value of property transactions by which the CGC measures the Territory's
relative capacity to raise revenue. In terms of the NT's budget categories
measured by the CGC, the Aboriginal population has a direct influence as
a result of their residential location in remote areas, its younger than
average age structure and its significantly higher unemployment, poverty,
illiteracy and illness.
The CGC further accepts that the NT faces particular disabilities in
providing services to Aboriginal people. As seen in Table 2, the
demographic profile and residential location of the Aboriginal population
mean that the Territory Government is assessed as having higher
disability factor values for specific expenditure functions. The high social
composition factor value assessed for the NT within the budgetary
expenditure categories or child welfare (NT - 1.6051; New South Wales -
1.0; Victoria - 0.9466) and emergency welfare relief and other services
(NT - 1.5514; New South Wales - 1.0; Victoria - 0.7822) reflect the
comparatively low level of Aboriginal incomes and high level of
Aboriginal unemployment in the NT (Tesfaghiorghis 1991).
The NT is also given additional weightings for certain expenditure needs,
over and above that given to all States, as a result of social composition
factors associated with its Aboriginal population. For example, in the
primary education category the NT receives an additional weighting of
7.5 per cent to the social composition factor because of 'its special
circumstances' (see Table 3). These circumstances create greater costs
and include: the dispersion of the relevant Aboriginal population; greater
numbers of rural and remote schools required; diseconomies of small-
scale; social composition factors to do with culturally appropriate
schooling and the non-English speaking characteristics of Aborigines in
the school-age population; and the fact that the NT has approximately 21
per cent of the total Australian enrolment of Aboriginal students,
constituting close to a third of its own primary school student population
(NT Government 1991a: 189-210).
Another example of the Aboriginal component to NT disability factor
values is seen in the CGC assessment of Technical and Further Education
services. These are assessed for the NT as having an additional 'stage of
development1 disability factor of 5 per cent broadly determined to reflect
11
Table 3. Commonwealth Grants Commission social composition
factor values for primary education (government and non-
government) by State/Territory, 1991.
State/Territory Factor values
Social composition
New South Wales 1.0000
Victoria 0.9916
Queensland 1.0083
Western Australia 1.0144
South Australia 1.0024
Tasmania 1.0019
Northern Territory 1.2611
Source: CGC (1991c).
the Territory's additional expenditure requirements (not covered by other
factors), owing to the preponderance of 'traditional Aboriginals in its
population (which) means that particular service delivery policies have to
be adopted' (CGC 1991c).
Two specific NT Government arguments for special fiscal needs are the
disability factors of land rights and sacred sites. These have been accepted
by the CGC as costs to the NT due to the influence of overriding
Commonwealth policies. For example, in the area of expenditure on
national parks and wildlife services, the NT obtains an additional factor
value for land rights (1.0 for all other States and 1.1 for the NT with
respect to the land rights factor, and 1.0 for all other States and 1.95 for
the NT with respect to the sacred sites factor). The land rights factor also
increases the NT's disability value in the expenditure areas of
administration of justice for additional costs incurred by the NT on
consideration of land claims under the Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern
Territory) Act 1976, and, in a series of other budgetary areas such as
supplying country water and sewerage, mapping and surveying, the
premier and treasurer's departments, and local government and town
planning (CGC 1991c). Both the Northern and Central Land Councils
have strongly argued that the NT Government's costs in administering
land rights (in particular, contesting land claims) hardly appears to be a
'service1 provided for the benefit of Territory Aborigines; but rather it is
a political decision and should accordingly be excluded from assessment
of its funding needs (CGC 1992c; CLC 1991; NLC 1991). Indeed, it has
been argued that the CGC's inclusion of the land rights argument
exacerbates the fiscal problems of NT Aboriginal land councils in so far
as the NT receives special assistance to challenge claims, thus adding to
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the land councils' own litigation costs (Altman and Dillon 1988: 130-1).
On the other hand, there are genuine additional costs borne by the NT,
such as those within the budget areas of mapping, surveying and national
parks, which are externally imposed and should be considered as
expenditure disabilities by the CGC.
Disability factor values assessed by the CGC for the NT standardised
budget are increased significantly as a result of the former's acceptance of
the Aboriginal component as increasing the NT's cost of service delivery.
The NT's favoured position in terms of its final relativity comes from the
interaction of effects between disability factors. In particular, the
combination of social composition factors (which highlight the proportion
of the population which is Aboriginal) with scale and dispersion factors
(which are heavily determined by the spread of the Aboriginal population
across a number of isolated, small communities) are key factors affecting
the CGC's assessment of NT fiscal needs. The interaction of these
disability factors, based on the cost-related characteristics of the
Aboriginal population, combine to produce higher factor values for
particular expenditure categories for the NT compared to other States,
and to produce the NT's high global relativity. In this sense, just as there
is an Aboriginal component to the higher per capita cost of providing
services to its population, there is also a significant Aboriginal component
to the determination of the NT's general revenue receipts from the
Commonwealth.
The Aboriginal Community Services budget category
Aboriginal Community Services (ACS) is one of some 100 budgetary
functions used by the CGC in order to arrive at state standardised budgets.
This category comprises all State and Commonwealth recurrent
expenditure incurred in Aboriginal communities, including the provision
of community management and local government-type services, and the
recurrent (not capital) costs of operating, repairing and maintaining
essential services for these communities. The latter include water, power,
sewerage, internal access roads (excluding Commonwealth-funded road
projects), airstrips, barge landings, telecommunications and cyclone
shelters.
The ACS category is one of the very few expenditure areas where the
factor assessment method is not used by the CGC. Instead, calculations of
state financial needs are based on actual expenditure by each State; that is,
by the per capita difference method. The CGC measures the ACS function
by looking at state departmental budgets and determining which areas of
actual expenditure are relevant to that category. Basically, the CGC
concludes that what each State and Territory spends in this area (in net
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terms) is what it needs to spend. Any receipts obtained by a State from
recovery, by charges against delivery of services, included within the
ACS category, are deducted by the CGC from that State's total ACS
expenditure. The CGC, in effect, accepts the 'implied' disability evident in
the expenditure differences between States. The implied level of disability
is arrived at by calculating the difference between a State's actual
expenditure and the average expenditure of the seven States. The implied
disability is then multiplied against the seven State average to give a
specific State's standardised expenditure for that function. This method
essentially means that States can increase (or decrease) their assessed
funding needs, and hence their level of Commonwealth grants, by
increasing their expenditure in this category. This is, of course, also
dependent on the size of the overall pool of money made available by the
Commonwealth.
The standardised expenditure assessed for the ACS budget function is then
summed with all other standardised expenditures for a State to give (after
other adjustments), its total financial assistance requirement. In this
manner, the ACS function becomes part of the budgetary expenditure
stream measured by the CGC and is translated, along with all other
expenditures, into the final relativity factor for that State. The
Commonwealth does not allocate an amount specifically referred to as
ACS to a State budget. Funds based on this category come as part of total
untied general revenue grants. It is up to each State to subsequently match
future expenditure against previous expenditure in this area if they choose
to seek CGC assessment under the specific methodology applying to the
ACS function. It is not necessary for a State Government to spend untied
funds under this category, though low or absent expenditure will
accordingly be reflected in the CGC's future assessment of implied need.
It should be noted, however, that it is not a simple matter of one year's
expenditure within this category being directly equivalent to next year's
funds. The CGC updates its grant relativities each year on the basis of a
rolling five-yearly average of expenditure figures. This procedure is also
used in CGC assessments of state expenditure within the ACS category, hi
other words, there is a 'lag in the system' (CGC 1991a: 5) whereby a
State's future financial year's funding need within the ACS area is assessed
on a rolling, updated average of the previous five.
The CGC faces a number of difficulties in identifying and quantifying the
cost factors involved in the ACS category. In particular, it must
determine what range of services and functions should be included;
whether they should take into account relative disadvantage within the
Aboriginal population itself; the definition of Aboriginal community; and
the rather blurred distinction between recurrent expenditure in this
category (which the CGC includes) and capital expenditures (which the
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CGC excludes). The method of assessing the anomalous ACS function is
currently being reviewed by the CGC in its inquiry into the methods used
for calculating the share of Commonwealth general purpose grants. It is
likely that the CGC will move towards a method based on attempting to
quantify expenditure needs within ACS, as it does in other budget
categories, rather than taking actual state expenditure as equivalent to an
implied disability.
One can argue (as have some Aboriginal interests) that the ACS
expenditure function, currently assessed as an implied disability factor,
represents an associated dollar funding contribution towards specific
services for each State's Aboriginal population. On the other hand, the
CGC is not actually recommending an absolute dollar grant for the ACS
category (or for any other disability factor); rather it is using a system of
measuring disability values for state expenditure needs which contribute
to the recommended final relativity ratio. It is this 'bottom-line1 relativity
which is used by the Commonwealth Government to determine the States'
overall assessed financial needs. While the CGC's role is limited to
assessing fiscal capacity, state policies directly determine performance,
especially at the program and service delivery level. Currently, the State
Governments are not accountable for expenditure of untied
Commonwealth funds. Assuming that all such monies are actually spent in
the ACS expenditure area according to which they are measured, then
those States that spend more on ACS-related services could be said to be
directly benefiting the Aboriginal population more greatly. On the other
hand, higher service delivery costs to remote populations may well
account for higher expenditure for the same (or even lower) levels of
service provision. Even so, under the current CGC assessment approach,
governments with higher ACS expenditure will be ensuring themselves
continuing Commonwealth reimbursement of those monies at virtually the
equivalent rate.
Aboriginal Community Services within the Northern Territory
budget
Within the ACS budget function, the NT again fares better than any other
State (see Table 4). The 1989-90 CGC assessment of Territory needs,
undertaken as part of the 1991 relativities update, included $60.9 million
for the ACS function. In 1990-91, the NT's actual expenditure was $60.5
million; over twice as much as the next highest spender in any other State
(being Queensland with $28.6 million). In per capita terms, in 1990-91,
the NT spent $382.8 in the ACS category, in comparison with the national
standard of $7.8 per capita. Only 8 per cent of NT expenditure in this
area occurred via specific purpose payments (SPP), compared to the
average of 46 per cent for the remaining States (see Table 4).
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Table 4. Aboriginal Community Services: actual state
expenditure ($ total and per capita), 1990-91.
State $ million $ per capita Percentage of expenditure
funded by SPP
New South Wales
Victoria
Queensland
Western Australia
South Australia
Tasmania
Northern Territory
2.670
.624
28.637
26.780
12.446
.218
60.528
0.46
0.14
9.74
16.23
8.59
0.48
382.80
5.62
100.00
11.20
48.60
52.98
60.09
8.08
Source: CGC (1991d) and unpublished CGC data.
In 1990-91, the CGC assessed NT total gross expenditure under ACS as
being approximately $64.4 million (see Table 5). This included a range of
NT departmental expenditure, as well as the deduction of a $2.8 million
Commonwealth specific purpose (recurrent) payment for local
government financial assistance to remote communities. Included as a NT
expenditure was a $4.9 million Commonwealth grant-in-aid for
community infrastructure. The CGC deducted revenue obtained by the
NT under the ACS category. In 1990-91, this amounted to $3.8 million
obtained by the NT Power and Water Authority (PAWA) under its
Aboriginal Essential Services program, for charges against supply of
power services to Aboriginal communities. After this deduction the NT
had a net ACS expenditure, measured by the CGC, of $60.5 million. In
the five years from 1986 to 1990, the NT had an average net expenditure
of $55.5 million under this category.
The CGC has accepted that the Territory needs to spend a lot more on this
function than other States (CGC 1992b: 11). This is despite the fact that
Queensland and Western Australia both have larger Aboriginal
populations than the NT (61,266 and 37,790, respectively) and would
incur many of the same range of disabilities and associated costs in
program and service delivery.10 There are, in fact, a number of legitimate
reasons for the CGC acceptance of the NT's higher implied disability
under the ACS category. Once again, the interactive effect of a
combination of location-specific disabilities (especially dispersion, point
of delivery scale, isolation, whole-of-State stage of development factors,
and the higher proportion of Aboriginal people in the total population)
which the NT faces in delivery of services, plays a significant part in the
higher costs it faces.
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Table 5. Northern Territory expenditure identified by the
Commonwealth Grants Commission for Aboriginal Community
Services, 1990-91.
NT Department Total ($ million)
Expenditure
Public Service-Office of Public Service Commissioner
Aboriginal development 0.740
Office of Local Government (ACS) 22.806
Treasury-computer technology and services
Transport and works (ACS) 0.046
Lands and housing (ACS) 0.247
Transport and Works
Aboriginal communities - capital 1.873
Aboriginal essential services 2.766
Property management-office of Public Service Commissioner (ACS) 0.047
Commonwealth receipts - SPP (Recurrent)
Local government financial assistance -remote communities -2.821
Conservation Commission (ACS) 0.024
Commonwealth grants-in-aid
Community infrastructure 4.891
Power and Water Authority
Aboriginal essential services 33.738
Gross expenditure 64.357
Revenue
Power and Water Authority
Aboriginal essential services - electricity 3.829
Gross revenue 3.829
Net expenditure (gross expenditure minus gross revenue) 60.528
Source: CGC (1991d).
Indeed, the NT Government (1991b: 267-76) has argued that its total
expenditure needs are, if anything, understated as a result of the CGC's
limited definition of what constitutes the ACS. For example, the NT
submits that council administration, animal control, cemeteries, council
houses, sanitation and garbage, and many other functions which
Aboriginal community councils and associations undertake, should be
included within the community management component of ACS.11 It has
also argued strongly that CGC current assessment methods do not allow
for expenditure levels sufficient to deliver adequate services to NT
Aboriginal communities (NT Government 1991b: 274). Given the high
costs of service delivery, the NT's higher expenditure under the ACS
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category does not necessarily mean a greater level of service provision
than other States.
The recent introduction by the NT of a user-pays system to Aboriginal
communities for electricity supplies (at the standard NT urban tariff rate)
has led to considerable questioning of whether the government provides
the same quality of services to Aboriginal communities as it does to urban
centres. The NT has argued in its submission to the CGC that in the five-
year period up to 1990, the average tariff rate charged by PAWA was 75
per cent higher than that of state electricity authorities in Australia as a
whole, owing to population dispersion and absence of an interconnected
supply network linked to large-scale power generating systems (NT
Government 199la: 84). Costs are particularly high for provision of
electricity to remote NT communities: an average of 54 cents per kilowatt
hour, compared to an average 18 cents for the NT (NT Government
1991b: 290). The NT also has a higher than average commercial
consumption of electricity and reported $17 million power costs accruing
to NT Government departments and authorities, for which it did not
obtain full cost recovery (NT Government 199la: 84-6, 142). The result
is that the PAWA is not likely to recover operating costs either in urban
or remote areas for some time to come. The withdrawal of
Commonwealth subsidy to the PAWA from 1992-93 has placed increasing
pressure on the NT budget and hastened the need to seek full cost
recovery.
The issue of why the NT is instituting a user-pays system in remote
communities when any receipts are deducted (dollar for dollar) by the
CGC from NT expenditure under the ACS category, has been raised in a
number of quarters. As shown in Table 5, $3.8 million in PAWA revenue
receipts, from supply of electricity to Aboriginal communities, was
deducted from the NT's gross ACS expenditure in 1990-91. The ACS
implied disability factor for the NT is assessed by the CGC on the
resulting lower net expenditure of $60.5 million. It is in such service
expenditure areas that the NT Government's ongoing policy of
mainstreaming services to Aboriginal people is revealed, though it seems
at odds with the financial benefits accruing from fiscal equalisation (and
specifically from the per capita difference method used for assessing the
ACS category).
Apart from the NT imperative of mainstreaming services and charges in
the Aboriginal affairs areas, the progressive pressure towards establishing
the user-pays system may also be part of the NT Government's attempt to
gradually wean itself from an overly dependent financial relationship with
the Commonwealth Government. Further, the issue of user-pays for
Aboriginal communities also needs to be considered apart from the fact of
whether the current CGC methodology yields a virtual reimbursement to
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the NT of costs in servicing those communities. Careful consideration by
government will need to be given to the ways in which charges can be
linked to the often low and erratic levels of individual and household
income at different communities; what is the appropriate rate for remote
communities where services, when they do exist, may be unreliable or
substandard; who is to be responsible for recovery of charges; and what
type of services are actually required by different kinds of communities.
Commonwealth payments to the Northern Territory, 1990-91
In 1990-91, the NT received $1.1 billion from the Commonwealth
Government. The $729 million in general revenue assistance payments
was made up of $679 million in untied financial assistance grants and $50
million in special revenue assistance (which was funded from the financial
assistance grants pool). A further $44 million was paid as general purpose
capital payments, making a total of $773 million in general purpose
payments. The remaining Commonwealth payments came in the form of
Table 6. Commonwealth payments to the States and the
Northern Territory ($ million), 1990-91.
Commonwealth
payment
Total general
purpose
General revenue
General purpose
(current)
Total specific
purpose
NSW
3,781
3,702
80
4,705
Vic.
2,780
2,712
68
4,071
Qld
2,537
2,521
16
2,301
WA
1,570
1,548
22
1,344
SA
1,474
1,435
39
1,175
Tas.
549
522
27
433
NT
773
729
44
287
Total
13,464
13,167
297
14,318
Specific purpose
(current) 3,464 3,316 1,638 986 909 317 157 10,786
Specific purpose
(capital) 1,241 756 663 359 267 117 130 3,531
Total payments3 8,486 6,851 4,837 2,915 2,649 983 1,060 27,781
a These total payments represent gross estimates. After repayments by the Territory of
$33 million in 1990-91 are taken into account, the total Commonwealth payment to the
NT was $1.028 million (Commonwealth of Australia 199 Ic: 8).
Source: Commonwealth of Australia (1991c: 7-9).
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specific purpose payments; $157 million for current purposes and $130
million for capital (see Table 6). Of the Territory's total of $287 million
specific purpose payments, $249 million were allocated as payments to the
Territory and $38 million as payments through the Territory.
In 1990-91, specific purpose payments comprised a low 27 per cent of the
Territory's overall payments, while the other States received on average,
some 49 per cent of their Commonwealth revenue payments in the form
of specific purpose payments. Four specific purpose payments within the
NT budget for 1990-91 were allocated to Aboriginal-specific funding
areas: current funding for Aboriginal education ($12.1 million), the
national language policy ($0.4 million) and Aboriginal employment
training ($0.04 million); and capital payments for Aboriginal education
($2.2 million) and housing assistance for Aborigines ($19.5 million).
These represented 5 per cent of total specific purpose payments to the NT.
(See Appendix 1 for a detailed breakdown of specific purpose payments to
the NT in 1990-91.)
The NT received approximately 60 per cent of its budget receipts from
Commonwealth revenue payments in 1990-91; compared with
approximately 30 per cent for the other six States (NT Government 1992:
53; Stanley and Knapman 1992: 68). This was the lowest proportion since
1979-80, when the NT received a high 84 per cent of its revenue from
Commonwealth grants (Stanley and Knapman 1992: 70). Whilst the NT
relies heavily on Commonwealth funding, it has also incurred greater
recent reductions in those payments in comparison to the other States.
Between 1984-85 and 1990-91, there has been a reduction of net
Commonwealth payments to the Territory, in real terms, of 26 per cent,
compared with a real reduction of about 13 per cent to the six States (NT
Government 1991c: 22). Even so, on a per capita basis the NT was funded
at a rate of $6,494, over four times greater than the per capita rate of
$1,539 for total Australia (see Commonwealth of Australia 1991c: 9).12
However, the NT's higher global relativity factor is an indication of the
degree to which the NT is reliant upon the fiscal equalisation process to
achieve the capacity to provide the same standard services as other States.
It does not represent an advantageous position over and above other
States. The extent that it does occur is evident in the NT's being the only
recipient of special revenue assistance in 1990-91, receiving
approximately $50 million which was taken from the general revenue
pool available for distribution to all States by the Commonwealth. The
1991 Premiers' Conference agreed that the NT be provided with similar
assistance of $40 million in 1991-92. Without such payment, general
revenue assistance to the NT would have fallen by about 3 per cent in real
terms in 1990-91. Even so, this still represents a phasing down of the
level of special revenue assistance provided to the NT and is consistent
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with the Commonwealth's commitment to progressively move the NT to a
financial basis comparable to that of the other six States (Commonwealth
of Australia 1991c: 60).
Aboriginal affairs policy implications
The nature of the NT'sfiscal dependence
The NT exhibits an unusual set of economic and political characteristics.
Since attaining self-government in 1978 it has quickly negotiated the
shifting sands of Commonwealth funding, a process facilitated by the
Memorandum of Understanding. Nevertheless, its economy is at a
precarious stage of development, heavily dependent on Commonwealth
revenue payments, on growth predicated upon resource development, and
constrained by deficiencies in transportation and diseconomies of scale
related to its small, widely-dispersed population. At the same time, the NT
is expected to supply the range of standard services at the same level as
other States.
There are noticeable differences between the NT economy and the rest of
Australia, one of which is the clearly distinguished Aboriginal and non-
Aboriginal components. The NT labour market, compared to the rest of
Australia, is characterised by a higher participation rate of 70.6 per cent
in 1990-91 (63.7 per cent for Australia). However, the NT also has the
lowest percentage of Aboriginal people in employment (26 per cent,
compared to 32.6 per cent for the total Aboriginal population), and the
highest rate of Aboriginal people not participating in the labour force (60
per cent, compared to 49.6 per cent for the total Aboriginal population)
(Tesfaghiorghis 1991: 19).1*
The NT economy is characterised by a large public sector which
employed 36.1 per cent of total wage and salary earners, compared to
28.3 per cent for Australia in 1990-91. The great majority of these (76
per cent) were employed in the NT Public Service (NT Government
1991d: 10). For both Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal Territorians, the
community services industry (which depends largely on public funds) is
the major employer industry group. However, Aboriginal employment is
more heavily concentrated in the combined areas of community services
and public administration (56 per cent of employed Aborigines) than for
the remainder of the Territory population (33 per cent) in 1986 (ABS
1990: 85).14
Similarly, whilst overall Territory average weekly earnings are slightly
higher than for total Australia ($608.40 compared to $597.80 in 1990-91;
NT Government 199Id: 14), greater differences emerge between
Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal Territorians. In 1986, the proportion of
21
Aboriginal people in the NT in the lowest income bracket (below $173
per week) was twice that recorded for the remainder of the NT
population (ABS 1990: 89). In an assessment of Aboriginal socioeconomic
status across Australia, Tesfaghiorghis (1991: 16) concluded that
Aborigines in both the NT and Western Australia had the lowest ranking
according to standard social indicators.15
In 1991, public service and defence industries contributed 22.5 per cent of
Territory gross domestic product (GDP) compared to 15.6 per cent for
Australia. Minerals, oils and gas contributed 22.3 per cent compared to
4.6 per cent for Australia. Manufacturing contributed only 4.4 per cent to
Territory GDP compared to 16.3 per cent for Australia. The NT
recreation and tourism industry contributed 6.1 per cent compared to 4.2
per cent for Australia (NT Government 199Id). Over 60 per cent of
manufacturing activity in the NT is directed towards the processing of
minerals (NT Government 199Id: 43). Likewise, the Territory's housing
and construction industry is heavily reliant upon mining, oil and gas
developments, and upon tourist developments, as well as on the periodic
expansion of Commonwealth defence forces. Growth in the Territory's
economy is seen to be centred on tourism and mining, with the
government predicting that mining will soon overtake public
administration and defence as the most important sector (ibid.: 9).
However, mining ranks low in terms of its benefits to NT income and
employment and would require a great expansion to achieve significant
spin-offs to the NT economy (Stanley and Knapman 1992: 29). In terms
of income and employment generation and diversification, the best
industry performers in the NT economy are tourism, public
administration, and defence (Stanley and Knapman 1992). The last two
are substantially dependent on Commonwealth funds.
The Territory economy operates in parallel with the Commonwealth
Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act, 1976 which enables the
conversion of areas of unalienated Crown land to Aboriginal title. The
Act contains special provisions for the payment of royalty equivalents,
amounts equivalent to the royalties raised on Aboriginal land. These
royalty equivalents are paid by the Commonwealth to the Aboriginals
Benefit Trust Account (ABTA) and in turn used to fund Aboriginal land
councils, as compensation to Aboriginal people living in areas affected by
mining, and as general grants to and for the benefit of Aboriginal people
in the NT. In 1990-91, mining royalty equivalents from the
Commonwealth of $33.3 million dollars were credited to the ABTA
(ABTA 1992: 2). At the same time, the NT Government received $28.4
million mining royalties (excluding uranium) directly from mining
companies (NT Government 1991e: 5). Payments to the NT from the
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Commonwealth in lieu of uranium royalties were $2.9 million (NT
Government 199Id: 23).
It has been argued that the impact of mining on Aboriginal land has been
positive for the NT economy (Altman and Dillon 1988: 134). Effectively,
royalty equivalents constitute extra revenue to the NT. Almost all of NT
royalty receipts accrue from resource developments on Aboriginal land,
and the major proportion of monies paid by the ABTA to Aboriginal
interests are spent in the NT and have subsequent local economic spin-
offs. At the same time, capital invested by Aboriginal royalty associations
and development corporations, through royalty payments and direct
Commonwealth funds are having a positive effect on NT regional
economies (Altman 1989; Crough et al. 1989; Stanley and Knapman
1992).
The Territory economy is resource dependent in two ways. Firstly, in the
sense of being tied to the development of its natural resources and
secondly, in continuing to receive high levels of financial resources from
the Commonwealth. At the same time, it is unlikely that there will be a
reduction in the NT's cost structure for some time to come. Much of the
government's policy and program directions, both for its Aboriginal and
non-Aboriginal citizens, are based on the uneasy tensions generated by
such financial dependence. Of its actual, total budgetary expenditure in
1990-91 of $1,778 million, $1,061 million (60 per cent) was provided
from the Commonwealth Government. The steady real decline in
Commonwealth payments since 1984-85 has not been fully compensated
for by an increase in Territory-based receipts. Further, the reduction in
Commonwealth grants has a greater impact on the NT economy because
of its very dependency on those payments. For example, a 10 per cent
reduction in the 1991-92 budget would be equal to a per capita reduction
of $608.60 for the Territory, but only $133.70 for New South Wales
(Stanley and Knapman 1992: 66). This has caused increasing budgetary
pressures for the NT government and has made an already high
commitment to 'developmentalism' (Heatley 1986) even more persuasive.
The NT's greater per capita dependence on the Commonwealth makes it
more vulnerable to changes in federal funding policies and procedures.
Providing 'State-like' services in the NT
Clearly, any reduction in the crucial financial role played by fiscal
equalisation would have significant consequences for the NT budget. The
CGC calculated that if location-specific disabilities were excluded from
the equalisation model, Commonwealth payments to the NT in 1988-89
would have been reduced by a considerable $385 million, equal to 30 per
cent of NT Government total outlays in that year.16 By comparison,
Western Australia, the State next worst affected by such a reduction,
would face a cut representing only 2.4 per cent of its total outlays in the
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same financial year (NT Government 1991c: 74). In such an event, the
NT Government would have great difficulty in maintaining a range of
services at the same level as other States.
There are clear tensions existing between Commonwealth and NT policy
directions, especially in the area of expenditure on Aboriginal programs
and services. For example, the Commonwealth Treasury has argued that
in order to maximise allocative efficiency within the budget process and
reduce costs, public sector services should be curtailed where the costs of
provision are higher than their value to users. The basis for this
recommendation is the argument that particular distributions of
population or other resources that happen to exist among States or
locations within States at any particular time should not necessarily be
preserved if they negatively effect the efficiency of financial distribution
(see NT Government 199Ic: 72). A correlative argument is that the
measurement of disabilities concerned with such distributions (such as
locational and diseconomies of scale disabilities) should be reassessed and,
perhaps, made more restricted in their impact.
It may well be the case that highly dispersed, small populations minimise
allocative efficiency and maximise diseconomies of scale. But this
argument for allocative efficiency pays little attention to the particular
characteristics of the NT population where the majority of Aboriginal
people reside at numerous small, isolated communities. Indeed, over the
last two decades this dispersion has been actively facilitated by the
Commonwealth through its policy of Aboriginal self-determination, land
rights legislation and funding support which have encouraged the
movement of Aboriginal people away from townships to outstations
(Blanchard 1987). The cultural imperatives at the basis of this movement
will ensure that the resulting 'inefficient1 dispersion of the Aboriginal
population, contrary to Commonwealth Treasury arguments, will be
maintained. Indeed, the NT population is likely to become more, rather
than less, decentralised.
There are a number of dilemmas, both for the NT Government and for
Aboriginal people, surrounding the issue of the provision and type of
services to be delivered to communities and outstations; especially those
more remotely located. While the Commonwealth Government initially
viewed the outstation movement as a cost-effective development, a
number of outstations have progressively increased in size, commenced
servicing other satellite outstations, and increasingly required a wider
range of specialised and standard state services. Any diminution of
location and scale disability factors would have considerable negative
impact upon the level of funding available for provision of services to
Aboriginal people resident in remote and rural areas. Given the degree of
socioeconomic disadvantage reported for the NT and total Aboriginal
24
population, there are strong grounds for arguing that these disability
payments be maintained when considering state expenditure needs related
to Aboriginal affairs.
It should not be assumed that the CGC-determined global relativity for the
NT provides it with the capacity to deliver the standard range of services
at average cost levels, for its entire population. Firstly, the CGC
assessment covers only 70 per cent of the NT Government's budget
functions and certainly does not address the historical deficiencies in
infrastructure provision relative to other States. Secondly, the additional
per capita weightings received for standard budget functions are
effectively spread by the NT Government over a much wider range of
expenditure requirements. Thirdly, population dispersion, together with
the social and cultural characteristics of the Aboriginal population, create
higher costs with respect to delivery of services across the entire set of
budgetary expenditure areas. Fourthly, while the NT has stage of
development factors, such as a reduced range of public service functions
performed (there are 14 administrative units represented in one or more
States that are not represented in the NT), it does not have the benefit of a
disability based on the backlog of expenditure needs (Smith 1992). Along
with associated high administrative costs and diseconomies of small-scale,
such factors combine to emphasise the financial advantages of providing a
selected range of services through centralised agencies, of program
mainstreaming, and standardised charging. This type of selective service
economy will be characterised by reduced operation at the peripheries of
population settlement. Current Commonwealth policy objectives, on the
other hand, inevitably require the extension of often specialised, culturally
appropriate services to smaller populations, scattered across a wider
geographic area.17
Another central tension between Commonwealth and State policy
directions is the consideration of cultural issues in the delivery of services
to Aboriginal people. The issue here is not simply one of 'cultural
appropriateness', but of the need to take into account the considerable
cultural heterogeneity evident in the NT Aboriginal population. These
cultural differences will require both policy and program flexibility to
account for the diverse circumstances under which Aboriginal people live,
including the progressive decentralisation of the population. There will be
a real financial impact for the NT in introducing such program flexibility.
Commonwealth pressure for allocative efficiency and specialised services
will need to be balanced by a 'policy realism' based on an
acknowledgement of the financial impact of the contradictions between
Commonwealth and NT policy (Altman and Sanders 1991).
In fact, one could question the appropriateness of the underlying
assumption of being able to provide State-like services. In the longer
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term, one should be able to expect the extent of Aboriginal socioeconomic
disadvantage to abate owing to the significant Aboriginal component of
the Commonwealth determination of NT general revenue grants.
However, there is no reason to assume that disability factors encountered
by the NT such as the high cost of providing services, the small, dispersed
population, diseconomies of scale and so on, are either temporary or
transitional (NT Government 1991c: 27). To this extent, such disabilities
will continue to impede the rate at which Aboriginal socioeconomic
disadvantage can be overcome, especially in remote regions. The aim of
providing State-like services in the NT is one which will remain largely
dependent upon Commonwealth funding. The NT will require a
continuing high level of financial subvention if capacity equalisation at the
level of service provision is to be even feasible. A diminution of fiscal
equalisation will have immediate repercussions upon the economic
development and status of all NT residents and, especially and
disproportionately, upon disadvantaged Aboriginal people.
The Aboriginal component in the Northern Territory budget
The NT Government's budget is symbolically linked to the Territory's
Aboriginal population. In a real financial sense there exists an economic
co-dependence between all Territorians and Territory Aboriginal people.
As has been shown, there is a significant Aboriginal component to the
CGC's determination of expenditure disabilities for the NT. The
Territory Government is heavily reliant on this Aboriginal component to
receive sizeable and additional weightings to disability factors, thus
achieving its high CGC global relativity factor and its ultimate level of
Commonwealth allocations. However, the Aboriginal component to
allocations from the Commonwealth does not mean that the NT is in a
more advantaged financial situation than other States. On the contrary, the
reliance is indicative of a service economy that will continue to be
characterised by high costs and low cost recovery from a widely
dispersed, small population. Recently, the principle of fiscal equalisation
and the impact of certain disability factors on Commonwealth allocations
to the States have come under increasing pressure. There are strong
grounds for arguing that in the area of Aboriginal affairs, where the
Commonwealth exercises a special responsibility, the policy neutral role
of the CGC should be upheld and the principle of fiscal equalisation
maintained.
The NT Aboriginal population is similarly locked into a dependent
funding situation. It is reliant on continuing Commonwealth subvention of
the NT budget and locked into NT funding policy concerning the type and
style of service to be delivered. While the NT Government expends a high
total level of monies on services and programs having Aboriginal clients,
it does so overwhelmingly through mainstream programs and service
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deliverers (Smith 1992). The low level of tied grants in Commonwealth
allocations to the NT promotes Aboriginal dependency on discretionary-
outlays which are under increasing budgetary pressure and, accordingly,
afford little funding security or accountability for service delivery to the
Aboriginal population. It is in recognition of the Aboriginal component in
the NT budget and economy per se, and the low overall economic status
of the NT Aboriginal population, that strong calls are being made for an
ongoing accounting of Territory Government revenue and expenditure
related to the Aboriginal population (CGC 1992c).
This call reflects similar recommendations for more detailed accounting
of government expenditure on Aboriginal services in Western Australia
(Arthur 1991; Equal Opportunity Commission 1990), Queensland (Human
Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission 1988) and Australia in general
(Commonwealth of Australia 199la). Such an accounting is a very
complex task. Nevertheless, some preliminary steps appear to already be
carried out by the CGC in its measurement of the ACS function within
state budgets. The CGC also receives detailed expenditure and revenue
data from the States for its annual relativity updates. In the case of the
NT, which is heavily reliant upon Aboriginal disability weightings, the
government provides important data on previous expenditure levels and
costs associated with particular programs which have Aboriginal clients.
In general though, state budgetary data provided to the CGC are not
broken down into their detailed Aboriginal components.
Administrative mechanisms need to be established at the State level to
facilitate the recording of Aboriginal client usage of programs and
services, associated cost structures, thus enabling Aboriginal program
expenditure data to be disaggregated. These data could be incorporated
into CGC determinations of state standardised revenue capacities and
expenditure requirements across a range of budgetary functions. Such an
accounting represents an attempt to make the Aboriginal component of
Commonwealth allocations and of State Government budgetary outlays
more transparent. It does not mean that subsequent Commonwealth funds
to States covering those functions would have to be linked to tied grant
payments, as demonstrated by the ACS approach. Rather, it would enable
an accounting procedure to be established which identifies the level of
state expenditure on programs and services for Aboriginal people.
A key policy implication of this paper concerns the future role of ATSIC
and its regional councils. One of the broader policy issues likely to have
considerable affect on future Aboriginal affairs funding includes the
pressure being asserted by the States to have taxing powers returned. If
taxing powers were to be progressively returned, the need to address the
principle of horizontal equity through the CGC would presumably be
considerably reduced, and the issue of funding for Aboriginal service
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provision at the State level left increasingly to the policy directions of
individual States. Clearly, the planning process being progressively
undertaken by ATSIC regional councils and offices could play an ongoing
role in negotiating the design and delivery of programs to Aboriginal
people at the regional and State level, and die level of associated
expenditure. ATSIC guidelines for developing regional plans recommend
that regional councils identify and gather data on their local and regional
economic base (ATSIC 1991b: 7). A crucial feature of Aboriginal
economies is, in fact, the government funding environment. The "bottom-
up" planning that may be possible in the regional and community planning
process will require a breakdown of government expenditure on
programs and services for Aboriginal people at the State and local level.
If ATSIC is to proceed with plans to negotiate bilateral funding
agreements between the Commonwealth and the States regarding the
funding and delivery of services to Aboriginal people, it will need to
commence negotiations for such comprehensive state expenditure data to
be made available. There appears to be a role for ATSIC in negotiating
procedures for the establishment of state accounting mechanisms via these
bilateral agreements and the regional planning process. Clearly, the CGC
already undertakes an assessment of some Aboriginal components of state
budgets on the basis of data provided by the States and the ABS. Given
that many areas of this assessment have incomplete data, both on usage
and expenditure at the program level, the CGC would also be in a position
to advise on budgetary areas where improved accounting could be
initiated. An invaluable spin-off from this process for Aboriginal
communities, their many organisations and Aboriginal local government
councils, will be the resulting availability of government expenditure data
relevant to their own community and region. There are strong grounds
for arguing that in the area of Aboriginal affairs, where the
Commonwealth does exercise a special responsibility, the policy neutral
role of the CGC should be upheld and the principle of fiscal equalisation
maintained.
Notes
1. The most important of these include the final national report from the Royal
Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody (Commonwealth of Australia
199la); the unpublished report by the Australian Aboriginal Affairs Council,
Achieving Greater Co-ordination of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Programs
and Services (Australian and Aboriginal Affairs Council 1991); and the
Commonwealth Budget Related Paper Social Justice for Indigenous Australians,
1991-92 (Commonwealth of Australia 1991b).
2. Throughout this paper 'State/s' is used to refer to both the States and Territories,
unless otherwise specified.
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3. During the period 1973-79, the CGC made recommendations to the Commonwealth
regarding funds to State local government authorities. In 1979, the CGC
recommended the use of the equal per capita method of allocating Commonwealth
funds to these authorities and distribution of monies was handed over to State
Grants Commissions. Since this period, the CGC's role in local government
funding issues has remained marginal, with the exception of its 1990 Inquiry into
the distribution of general purpose grants for local government, where it presented
options for a phasing-in of a distribution based on fiscal equalisation. The
recommendation was rejected by the Commonwealth.
4. The Working Group on Tied Grants, established as part of the review of
Commonwealth-State financial relations at the 1990 Special Premiers' Conference to
examine the current range of specific purpose payments to the States and Territories,
has developed two categories of SPP: 1. Payments to State Governments, being
payments direct to State and Territory Governments, excluding those made for
passing on to other bodies and individuals; and 2. Payments through States and
Territory Governments, being for passing on to other bodies and individuals,
including payments where the States had funding or other responsibilities in the
same area of expenditure, provided that those responsibilities were not exercised
through joint programs (SPP in the latter category include payments for higher
education, non-government schools, general purpose assistance to local government
and research grants to state institutions) (Commonwealth of Australia 1991c: 88).
5. The current major exception to the impact of fiscal equalisation is in the area of
Commonwealth funding of local government which is based on per capita
distributions according to conditions laid out in the Commonwealth Local
Government (Financial Assistance) Act, 1986. This area of funding is not assessed
by the CGC. Had the Commonwealth accepted CGC recommendations (CGC
1990b; 1991b) to alter the distribution to one based on fiscal equalisation, the
Territory would have received some $31.2 million in Commonwealth assistance, as
opposed to the $6.6 million it received in 1990-91 (NT Government 1991c: 44).
(See also Crough 1992; Mowbray 1986 and Wolfe 1989 for an assessment of the
impact of the distribution of local government funding on the NT Aboriginal
population.)
6. The CGC is currently undertaking a comprehensive review of the methods of
determining general revenue grant relativities (expected to be concluded in March
1993). It is anticipated that the CGC members of the review will recommend a
number of wide-ranging changes, one of which may be the reduction of the current
number of revenue and expenditure functions (just over 100, including some 70
expenditure areas) to approximately 70 overall areas (including around 41
expenditure functions).
7. Most recurrent Commonwealth specific purpose grants are treated by the inclusion
method in CGC determinations of relativity factors because they provide a source of
funds used to finance state recurrent services. ATSIC (1991a: 14) has argued that
where its grants (either made directly to Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people,
or through the States) are intended to be supplementary to mainstream programs to
overcome backlogs, they should be treated by the deduction method (that is,
deducted from total state expenditure on the function). It could be further argued that
in Aboriginal affairs, using the inclusion method impacts negatively upon both
States' willingness to increase their own funding in this area, and is counteractive
for a population with significant socioeconomic disadvantages. A strong argument
can be made for treating Commonwealth specific purpose grants in the Aboriginal
affairs area as an exemption to the inclusion method.
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8. In 1990, both New South Wales and Victoria were instrumental in having the period
over which the CGC calculates relativities extended from three to five years. This
was done in order to reduce the impact on CGC calculations, of rises in real estate
values in those two States. By including pre-boom years into the calculations they
were assessed as needing larger revenue snares. However, the subsequent real estate
downturn associated with the recession now penalises them in the new five-year data
periods. As Ian Davis has noted in his article, 'Kirner and Greiner bite the hand that
feeds them' (The Canberra Times, 16 June 1992: 9) the consequence has been that
rather than acknowledging that the opportunistic change which they made in 1990 is
the cause of their current problems, the larger States have in effect turned their attack
on the principle of equalisation.
9. The preliminary 1991 Census count of 37,698 for the NT Aboriginal population
appears to be understated and may total approximately 40,000. Given that the non-
Aboriginal preliminary total will also be revised by the final count, there will be little
difference in the actual proportion of the total NT population represented by
Aboriginal people.
10. It could also be argued that the significant difference between the NT, Western
Australia and Queensland in their ACS expenditure is due to the reluctance of the
latter two States to meet their financial responsibilities for providing services to
Aboriginal communities. Western Australia in particular, despite being seemingly
well placed to benefit from the current ACS methodology used by the CGC, has
been reluctant among the States to commit itself to recurrent expenditure on the ACS
function (See Arthur 1991; Equal Opportunity Commission 1990; Human Rights
and Equal Opportunity Commission 1988).
11. In fact, the CGC contends that currently these functions, with the exception of
council housing, are included in their ACS assessment process if a State provides
details of its actual expenditure in these categories.
12. These are total net per capita payments after repayments by the States, Territories
and Local Government Authorities have been deducted.
13. Percentage employed is defined here as the ratio of employed persons aged 15-64
years to the total Aboriginal population aged 15-64 years, times 100.
14. Historical data on changes in Aboriginal employment by industry in the NT between
1971 and 1986 Censuses are provided in Altaian and Daly 1992. The authors note
that during the 15-year period there were large falls in NT Aboriginal employment in
agriculture, and considerable growth in industries where the public sector was an
important employer.
15. Subsistence production has also been shown to be important (though with
considerable variations noted in the estimated reliance) for Aboriginal standards of
living at a number of NT outstation communities (Altaian 1987; Altaian and Taylor
1989; Blanchard 1987).
16. There is a marked difference in the distribution of the Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal
population in the NT. Almost two-thirds of Aboriginal people lived in rural areas in
1986 while the majority of non-Aboriginal people lived in urban areas. Clearly, the
financial impact of such location-specific disabilities is predominantly determined by
the NTs Aboriginal population.
17. Lawrence (1991) presents an analysis of the impact of these policy and program
contradictions between the Commonwealth and NT Governments in the area of road
regulations and charges on remote Aboriginal communities.
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Appendix
Table A.I. Total Commonwealth specific purpose payments to the
Northern Territory by type and expenditure category, 1990-91.
Commonwealth Specific Purpose Payments Expenditure
$ million
Specific Purpose Payments - current
Education
Higher education3 20.221
TAPE 1.977
Government schools 10.136
Non-government schools3 7.945
Joint schools program 1.164
Aboriginal education 12.079
National language policy 0.369
Total 53.891
Health
Hospital funding grants 22.414
Nurse education 0.120
Geriatric assessment 0.482
Home and community care 0.050
National better health 0.122
AIDS funds 0.612
Other health care access 0.040
Other health advancement 0.234
Drug education 0.293
Blood transfusion services 0.308
Total 24.675
Social Security and Welfare
Home and community care 1.455
Children's services 0.209
Mortgage and rent relief 0.287
Supported accommodation assistance 2.200
Translating and interpreting services 0.053
Total 4.204
Housing and Community Amenities
Home deposit assistance 0.061
Urban water supply and treatment 0.009
Urban flood mitigation 0.030
Environmental restoration 1.487
Rainforest conservation 0.143
Total 1.730
Transport
Aerodrome local ownership plan 0.072
Interstate road transport 0.513
Total 0.585
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Table A.I. Continued
Commonwealth Specific Purpose Payments
$ million
Expenditure
Industry Assistance and Development
Bovine brucellosis and tuberculosis
Exotic disease eradication
Rural adjustment scheme
Soil conservation
PAWA (NT) assistance
National industry extension service
Total
Labour and Employment
Employment training - Aboriginal
Total
General Public Services
Legal aid
Research at universities3
Total
Not Allocated to Functional
Sinking fund on state debt
Debt redemption assistance
Financial assistance - local government3
Compensation - companies regulation
Natural disaster relief
Royalties
Total
Total
24.149
0.030
1.124
1.226
30.000
0.101
56.630
0.044
0.044
2.361
0.420
2.781
1.590
0.125
6.564
1.022
0.002
3.427
12.730
157.270
Specific Purpose Payments - capital
Education
Higher education3
TAPE
Government schools
Non-Government schools3
Aboriginal education
Total
Health
Hospitals enhancement program
Blood transfusion services
Total
Social Security and Welfare
Home and community care
Children's services
Crisis accommodation assistance
Total
2.524
2.164
2.323
0.546
2.180
9.737
0.443
0.051
0.494
0.255
0.017
0.369
0.641
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Table A.I. Continued
Commonwealth Specific Purpose Payments Expenditure
$ million
Housing and Community Amenities
Pensioner housing grants 0.523
Housing assistance for Aborigines 19.458
Local government and community housing 0.227
Commonwealth - State Housing Agreement block assistance 40.673
Urban water supply and treatment 0.399
Urban flood mitigation 0.004
Total 61.284
Culture and Recreation
National estate 0.288
Total 0.288
Transport
Aerodrome - local ownership plan 0.134
Roads 56.860
Total 56.994
Industry Assistance and Development
Bovine brucellosis and tuberculosis 0.111
Total 0.111
Labour and Employment
Natural disaster relief 0.475
Total 0.475
Total 130.024
Total Specific Purpose Payments 287.294
a. Items marked are classified as payments made through the NT Government.
Source: Commonwealth of Australia (1992c: A.34-40).
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